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Abstract
We characterize all domains onwhich (i) every unanimous and strategy-proof social choice
function is a min-max rule, and (ii) every min-max rule is strategy-proof. As an application
of this result, we obtain a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof social choice
functions on maximal single-peaked domains (Moulin (1980), Weymark (2011)), minimally
rich single-peaked domains (Peters et al. (2014)), maximal regular single-crossing domains
(Saporiti (2009), Saporiti (2014)), and distance based single-peaked domains. We further con-
sider domains that exhibit single-peakedness only over a subset of alternatives. We call such
domains top-connected partially single-peaked domains and provide a characterization of
the unanimous and strategy-proof social choice functions on these domains. As an appli-
cation of this result, we obtain a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof so-
cial choice functions on multiple single-peaked domains (Reffgen (2015)) and single-peaked
domains on graphs. As a by-product of our results, it follows that strategy-proofness im-
plies tops-onlyness on these domains. Moreover, we show that strategy-proofness and group
strategy-proofness are equivalent on these domains.
The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge Salvador Barbera`, Somdatta Basak, Shurojit Chatterji, Indra-
neel Dasgupta, Jordi Masso´, Debasis Mishra, Manipushpak Mitra, Hans Peters, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Arunava
Sen, Shigehiro Serizawa, Ton Storcken, John Weymark, and Huaxia Zeng for their invaluable suggestions which
helped improve this paper. The authors are thankful to the seminar audience of the 11th Annual Conference on Eco-
nomic Growth and Development (held at the Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi during December 17-19, 2015),
International Conclave on Foundations of Decision and Game Theory, 2016 (held at the Indira Gandhi Institute of
Development Research, Mumbai during March 14-19, 2016), the 13th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and
Welfare (held at Lund, Sweden during June 28-July 1, 2016) and the 11th Annual Winter School of Economics, 2016
(held at the Delhi School of Economics, New Delhi during December 13-15, 2016) for their helpful comments. The
usual disclaimer holds.
yContact: gopakumar.achuthankutty@gmail.com
zCorresponding Author: souvik.2004@gmail.com
1
KEYWORDS: Strategy-proofness, min-max rules, min-max domains, single-peaked prefer-
ences, top-connectedness, partially single-peaked preferences, partly dictatorial generalized
median voter schemes.
JEL CLASSIFICATION CODES: D71, D82.
1. INTRODUCTION
We consider a standard social choice problemwhere an alternative has to be chosen based on pri-
vately known preferences of the agents in a society. Such a procedure is known as a social choice
function (SCF). Agents are strategic in the sense that they misreport their preferences whenever it
is strictly beneficial for them. An SCF is called strategy-proof if no agent can benefit by misreport-
ing her preferences, and is called unanimous if whenever all the agents in the society unanimously
agree on their best alternative, that alternative is chosen.
Most of the subject matter of social choice theory concerns the study of the unanimous and
strategy-proof SCFs for different admissible domains of preferences. In the seminal works by
Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975), it is shown that if a society has at least three alternatives
and there is no particular restriction on the preferences of the agents, then every unanimous and
strategy-proof SCF is dictatorial, that is, a particular agent in the society determines the outcome
regardless of the preferences of the others. The celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem hinges
crucially on the assumption that the admissible domain of each agent is unrestricted. However, it
is well established that inmany economic and political applications, there are natural restrictions
on such domains. For instance, in the models of locating a firm in a unidimensional spatial
market (Hotelling (1929)), setting the rate of carbon dioxide emissions (Black (1948)), setting the
level of public expenditure (Romer and Rosenthal (1979)), and so on, preferences admit a natural
restriction widely known as single-peakedness. Roughly speaking, the crucial property of a single-
peaked preference is that there is a prior order over the alternatives such that the preference
decreases as one moves away (with respect to the prior order) from her best alternative.
The study of single-peaked domains dates back to Black (1948). Moulin (1980) and Wey-
mark (2011) have characterized the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on such domains as
min-max rules.1,2 The characterization by Moulin (1980) and Weymark (2011) rests upon the as-
1Barbera` et al. (1993) and Ching (1997) provide equivalent presentations of this class of SCFs.
2A rich literature has developed around the single-peaked restriction by considering various generalizations and
extensions (see Barbera` et al. (1993), Demange (1982), Schummer and Vohra (2002), Nehring and Puppe (2007a), and
Nehring and Puppe (2007b)).
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sumption that the underlying domain is the maximal single-peaked domain, i.e., it contains all
single-peaked preferences with respect to a given prior order over the alternatives. However,
demanding the existence of all single-peaked preferences is a strong prerequisite in many practi-
cal situations.3 Therefore, it is important to relax the maximality assumption on a single-peaked
domain. On the other hand, min-max rules are quite popular for their desirable properties like
tops-onlyness and Pareto efficiency. Moreover, a subclass of min-max rules known as median rules
satisfies another desirable property called anonymity.
In continuity with the above discussion, we characterize all domains on which (i) every unan-
imous and strategy-proof social choice function is a min-max rule, and (ii) every min-max rule
is strategy-proof. We call such a domain amin-max domain. We show that a domain is a min-max
domain if and only if it is a single-peaked domain satisfying the top-connectedness property. The
top-connectedness property with respect to a prior order requires that for every two consecutive
(in that prior order) alternatives x and y, there exists a preference that places x at the top and y
at the second-ranked position.4 It is worth noting that in a social choice problem with m alterna-
tives, the number of preferences in a min-max domain can range from 2m  2 to 2m 1, whereas
that in the maximal single-peaked domain is exactly 2m 1. Thus, min-max domains include a
large class of restricted single-peaked domains.
A top-connected regular single-crossing domain (Saporiti (2009), Saporiti (2014)) is an example of
a min-max domain.5,6 Saporiti (2014) shows that an SCF is unanimous and strategy-proof on a
maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is a min-max rule.7 Our result shows that an SCF is
unanimous and strategy-proof on a top-connected regular single-crossing domain if and only if
it is a min-max rule. Thus, we extend Saporiti (2014)’s result by relaxing the maximality assump-
tion on a single-crossing domain. However, we assume the domains to be regular. Note that
a maximal single-crossing domain requires m(m   1)/2 preferences, whereas a top-connected
3See, for instance, the domain restriction considered in models of voting (Tullock (1967), Arrow (1969)), taxa-
tion and redistribution (Epple and Romer (1991)), determining the levels of income redistribution (Hamada (1973),
Slesnick (1988)), and measuring tax reforms in the presence of horizontal inequity (Hettich (1979)). Recently, Puppe
(2015) shows that under mild conditions these domains form subsets of the maximal single-peaked domain.
4The top-connectedness property is well studied in the literature (see Barbera` and Peleg (1990), Aswal et al.
(2003), Chatterji and Sen (2011), Chatterji et al. (2014), Chatterji and Zeng (2015), and Puppe (2015)).
5A domain is regular if every alternative appears as the top-ranked alternative of some preference in the domain.
6Single-crossing domains appear in models of taxation and redistribution (Roberts (1977), Meltzer and Richard
(1981)), local public goods and stratification (Westhoff (1977), Epple and Platt (1998), Epple et al. (2001)), coalition
formation (Demange (1994), Kung (2006)), selecting constitutional and voting rules (Barbera` and Jackson (2004)),
and designing policies in the market for higher education (Epple et al. (2006)).
7Saporiti (2014) provides a different but equivalent functional form of these SCFs which he calls augmented repre-
sentative voter schemes.
3
regular single-crossing domain requires 2m  2 preferences.
Although single-peaked domains are used to model many practical situations, several empir-
ical studies (Niemi and Wright (1987), Feld and Grofman (1988), Pappi and Eckstein (1998)) fail
to support the assumption that all the preferences of an agent are single-peaked. In view of this,
we consider domains which exhibit single-peakedness only over a subset of alternatives. We call
such domains top-connected partially single-peaked domains. We characterize the unanimous and
strategy-proof SCFs on such domains as partly dictatorial generalized median voter schemes (PDG-
MVS). Loosely put, a PDGMVS acts like a min-max rule over the subset of the domain where
single-peakedness is satisfied and like a dictatorial rule everywhere else.
Reffgen (2015) introduces the notion of multiple single-peaked domains and characterizes the
unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on such domains. A multiple single-peaked domain is the
union of several maximal single-peaked domains with respect to different prior orders over the
alternatives. A plausible justification for such a domain restriction is provided by Niemi (1969)
who argues that the alternatives can be ordered differently using different criteria (which he
calls an impartial culture) and it is not publicly known which agent uses what criterion. On
one extreme, such a domain becomes an unrestricted domain if there is no consensus among the
agents on the prior order, and on the other extreme, it becomes a maximal single-peaked domain
if all the agents agree on a single prior order.
We extend Reffgen (2015)’s result in two directions: (i) by requiring minimum knowledge
about the prior orders perceived by the agents, and (ii) by requiring a minimal set of single-
peaked preferences for each of these prior orders. We further show that top-connected partially
single-peaked domains contain almost all domains on which (i) every unanimous and strategy-
proof SCF is a PDGMVS, and (ii) every PDGMVS is strategy-proof. It is worthwhile to men-
tion that in a social choice problem with m alternatives, the number of preferences in a top-
connected partially single-peaked domain can range from 2m to m!, whereas that in a multiple
single-peaked domain with respect to k prior orders is approximately (depending on the prior
orders) k 2m 1. Thus, the class of top-connected partially single-peaked domains is quite large
including both single-peaked and unrestricted domains.
A crucial step in the proof of our characterization results is to establish the tops-onlyness prop-
erty. In case of multiple single-peaked domains (Reffgen (2015)), tops-onlyness property follows
from the sufficient condition provided in Chatterji and Sen (2011). However, top-connected
single-peaked and top-connected partially single-peaked domains do not satisfy their condition,
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and the novelty of our results lies in establishing the tops-onlyness property on these domains.
Lastly, we consider group strategy-proofness. Barbera` et al. (2010) provides a sufficient condi-
tion for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness on a domain. Top-
connected single-peaked domains satisfy their condition, and consequently, we obtain a charac-
terization of the unanimous and group strategy-proof SCFs on these domains as a corollary of
their result. However, top-connected partially single-peaked domains do not satisfy their con-
dition. Therefore, we independently establish the equivalence of strategy-proofness and group
strategy-proofness on these domains.
To put our results in perspective, we conclude this section by comparing them with a few
related articles. Owing to the desirable properties of min-max rules, Barbera` et al. (1999) charac-
terize maximal domains on which a given min-max rule is strategy-proof. In contrast, we char-
acterize domains where all min-max rules are strategy-proof. Recently, Arribillaga and Masso´
(2016) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two min-max rules
in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. However, our results identify the min-max rules
that are manipulable if single-peakedness is violated over a subset of alternatives. Chatterji et al.
(2013) study a related restricted domain known as a semi-single-peaked domain. Such a domain
violates single-peakedness around the tails of the prior order. They show that if a domain ad-
mits an anonymous (and hence non-dictatorial), tops-only, unanimous, and strategy-proof SCF,
then it is a semi-single-peaked domain. However, we show that if single-peakedness is violated
around the middle of the prior order, then there is no unanimous, strategy-proof, and anony-
mous SCF. Thus, our characterization result on top-connected partially single-peaked domains
complements that in Chatterji et al. (2013).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the usual social choice frame-
work in Section 2. In Section 3, we study the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on top-
connected single-peaked domains. Section 4 studies the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on
top-connected partially single-peaked domains. Section 5 deals with group strategy-proofness,
and the last section concludes the paper. All the omitted proofs are collected in Appendix A and
Appendix B.
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2. PRELIMINARIES
Let N = f1, ..., ng be a set of at least two agents, who collectively choose an element from a finite
set X = fa, a+ 1, . . . , b  1, bg of at least three alternatives, where a is an integer. For x, y 2 X
such that x  y, we define the intervals [x, y] = fz 2 X j x  z  yg, [x, y) = [x, y] n fyg,
(x, y] = [x, y] n fxg, and (x, y) = [x, y] n fx, yg. For notational convenience, whenever it is clear
from the context, we do not use braces for singleton sets, i.e., we denote sets fig by i.
A preference P over X is a complete, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation (also called
a linear order) defined on X. We denote byL(X) the set of all preferences over X. An alternative
x 2 X is called the kth ranked alternative in a preference P 2 L(X), denoted by rk(P), if jfa 2
X j aPxgj = k  1. A domain of admissible preferences, denoted by D, is a subset of L(X). An
element PN = (P1, . . . , Pn) 2 Dn is called a preference profile. The top-set of a preference profile PN,
denoted by t(PN), is defined as t(PN) = fx 2 X j r1(Pi) = x for some i 2 Ng. A domain D of
preferences is regular if for all x 2 X, there exists a preference P 2 D such that r1(P) = x. All the
domains we consider in this paper are assumed to be regular.
Definition 2.1. A social choice function (SCF) f on Dn is a mapping f : Dn ! X.
Definition 2.2. An SCF f : Dn ! X is unanimous if for all PN 2 Dn such that r1(Pi) = x for all
i 2 N and some x 2 X, we have f (PN) = x.
Definition 2.3. An SCF f : Dn ! X is manipulable if there exists i 2 N, PN 2 Dn, and P0i 2 D
such that f (P
0
i , PNni)Pi f (PN). An SCF f is strategy-proof if it is not manipulable.
Definition 2.4. An SCF f : Dn ! X is called dictatorial if there exists i 2 N such that for all
PN 2 Dn, f (PN) = r1(Pi).
Definition 2.5. A domain D is called dictatorial if every unanimous and strategy-proof SCF f :
Dn ! X is dictatorial.
Definition 2.6. Two preference profiles PN, P0N are called tops-equivalent if r1(Pi) = r1(P
0
i ) for all
agents i 2 N.
Definition 2.7. An SCF f : Dn ! X is called tops-only if for any two tops-equivalent PN, P0N 2 Dn,
f (PN) = f (P0N).
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Definition 2.8. A domain D is called tops-only if every unanimous and strategy-proof SCF f :
Dn ! X is tops-only.
Definition 2.9. A preference P 2 L(X) is called single-peaked if for all x, y 2 X, [x < y 
r1(P) or r1(P)  y < x] implies yPx. A domain S is called a single-peaked domain if each prefer-
ence in it is single-peaked, and a domain S¯ is called a maximal single-peaked domain if it contains
all single-peaked preferences.
Definition 2.10. An SCF f : Dn ! X is called uncompromising if for all PN 2 Dn, all i 2 N, and
all P0i 2 D:
(i) if r1(Pi) < f (PN) and r1(P0i )  f (PN), then f (PN) = f (P0i , P i), and
(ii) if f (PN) < r1(Pi) and f (PN)  r1(P0i ), then f (PN) = f (P0i , P i).
REMARK 2.1. If an SCF satisfies uncompromisingness, then by definition, it is tops-only.
Definition 2.11. Let b = (bS)SN be a list of 2n parameters satisfying: (i) bS 2 X for all S  N,
(ii) bÆ = b, bN = a, and (iii) for any S  T, bT  bS. Then, an SCF f b : Dn ! X is called a
min-max rule with respect to b if
f b(PN) = min
SN
fmax
i2S
fr1(Pi), bSgg.
REMARK 2.2. Every min-max rule is uncompromising.8
Now, we introduce a few graph theoretic notions. A directed graph G is defined as a pair hV, Ei,
where V is the set of nodes and E  V  V is the set of directed edges, and an undirected graph G
is defined as a pair hV, Ei, where V is the set of nodes and E  ffu, vg j u, v 2 V and u 6= vg is
the set of undirected edges. For a graph (directed or undirected) G = hV, Ei, a subgraph G0 of G is
defined as a graph G0 = hV, E0i, where E0  E. For two graphs G1 = hV1, E1i and G2 = hV2, E2i,
the graph G1 [ G2 is defined as G1 [ G2 = hV1 [V2, E1 [ E2i.
All the graphs we consider in this paper are of the kind G = hX, Ei, i.e., whose node set is the
set of alternatives.
Definition 2.12. A directed (undirected) graph G = hX, Ei is called the directed (undirected) line
graph on X if (x, y) 2 E (fx, yg 2 E) if and only if jx  yj = 1.
8For details, see Weymark (2011).
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Definition 2.13. Let x, y 2 X be such that x < y  1. Then, a graph G is called a directed (undi-
rected) partial line graph with respect to x and y if G can be expressed as G1 [G2, where G1 = hX, E1i
is the directed (undirected) line graph on X and G2 = h[x, y], E2i is a directed (undirected) graph
such that (x, x0), (y, y0) 2 E2 (fx, x0g, fy, y0g 2 E2) for some x0 2 (x+ 1, y] and y0 2 [x, y  1).
In Figure 1, we present a directed partial line graph on X = fx1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7g with
respect to x3 and x6.
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7
Figure 1: A directed partial line graph
Definition 2.14. The top-graph of a domain D is defined as the directed graph hX, Ei such that
(x, y) 2 E if and only if there exists a preference P 2 D with r1(P) = x and r2(P) = y.
3. TOP-CONNECTED SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS
In this section, we introduce the notion of top-connected single-peaked domains and charac-
terize the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on these domains. We begin with a few formal
definitions.
Definition 3.1. A domain D satisfies the top-connectedness property if for all x, x + 1 2 X, there
are P, P0 2 D such that r1(P) = r2(P0) = x and r2(P) = r1(P0) = x+ 1.
Note that a domain satisfies the top-connectedness property if and only if its top-graph is the
directed line graph on X.
Definition 3.2. A domain Sˆ is called a top-connected single-peaked domain if it is a single-peaked
domain and it satisfies the top-connectedness property.
Note that the minimum cardinality of a top-connected single-peaked domain with m alter-
natives is 2m   2. Also, since the maximal single-peaked domain is also top-connected single-
peaked, the maximum cardinality of such domains is 2m 1. Thus, the class of top-connected
single-peaked domains is quite large. Inwhat follows, we provide an example of a top-connected
single-peaked domain with five alternatives.
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Example 3.1. Let X = fx1, x2, x3, x4, x5g, where x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 < x5. Then, the domain in
Table 1 is a top-connected single-peaked domain.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12
x1 x2 x2 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5
x2 x1 x3 x3 x3 x2 x4 x4 x4 x3 x5 x4
x3 x3 x4 x1 x4 x4 x2 x5 x2 x5 x3 x3
x4 x4 x1 x4 x5 x5 x5 x2 x1 x2 x2 x2
x5 x5 x5 x5 x1 x1 x1 x1 x5 x1 x1 x1
Table 1: A top-connected single-peaked domain
In Figure 2, we present the top-graph of the domain in Example 3.1.
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
Figure 2: Top-graph of the domain in Example 3.1
3.1 UNANIMOUS AND STRATEGY-PROOF SCFS
In this subsection, we provide a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on
top-connected single-peaked domains.
Theorem 3.1. Let Sˆ be a top-connected single-peaked domain. Then, an SCF f : Sˆn ! X is unanimous
and strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
The proof of the Theorem 3.1 is relegated to Appendix A.
The following corollary is immediate from Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.1 (Moulin (1980); Weymark (2011)). Let S¯ be the maximal single-peaked domain. Then,
an SCF f : S¯n ! X is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
3.2 MIN-MAX DOMAINS
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of min-max domains and provide a characterization
of these domains. In the following, we provide a formal definition of min-max domains.
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Definition 3.3. A domain D is called a min-max domain if
(i) every unanimous and strategy-proof SCF on Dn is a min-max rule, and
(ii) every min-max rule on Dn is strategy-proof.
Our next theorem provides a characterization of the min-max domains.
Theorem 3.2. A domain is a min-max domain if and only if it is a top-connected single-peaked domain.
Proof. The proof of the if part follows from Theorem 3.1. We proceed to prove the only-if part.
Let D be a min-max domain. We show that D is a top-connected single-peaked domain. First,
we show that D is a single-peaked domain. Assume for contradiction that there is Q 2 D and
x, y 2 X such that x < y < r1(Q) and xQy. Consider the min-max rule f b with respect to
(bS)SN such that bS = x for all Æ ( S ( N. Take PN 2 Dn such that P1 = Q and r1(Pi) = y for
all i 2 N n 1. By the definition of f b, f b(PN) = y. Now, take P01 2 D with r1(P01) = x. Again, by
the definition of f b, f b(P01, PNn1) = x. This means agent 1 manipulates at PN via P
0
1, which is a
contradiction to the assumption thatD is a min-max domain. Hence, D must be a single-peaked
domain.
Now, we show that D satisfies the top-connectedness property. Note that since D is single-
peaked, r1(P) = a (or b) implies r2(P) = a+ 1 (or b  1). Consider some x 2 X n fa, bg. Since
D is single-peaked, for all P 2 D, r1(P) = x implies r2(P) 2 fx   1, x + 1g. Without loss
of generality, assume for contradiction to the top-connectedness property that for all P 2 D,
r1(P) = x implies r2(P) = x  1. Consider the following SCF:9
f (PN) =
8>>><>>>:
x if r1(P1) = x and xPj(x  1) for all j 2 N n 1,
x  1 if r1(P1) = x and (x  1)Pjx for some j 2 N n 1,
r1(P1) otherwise.
It is left to the reader to verify that f is unanimous and strategy-proof. We show that f is
not uncompromising, which in turn means that f is not a min-max rule. Let PN 2 Dn be such
that r1(P1) = x and r1(Pj) = x   1 for some j 6= 1, and let P01 2 D be such that r1(P01) = x + 1.
Then, by the definition of f , f (PN) = x   1 and f (P01, PNn1) = x + 1. Therefore, f violates
uncompromisingness. Thus, the proof of the only-if part is complete. 
9Here D satisfies the unique seconds property defined in Aswal et al. (2003) and the SCF f considered here is
similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem 5.1 in Aswal et al. (2003).
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3.3 APPLICATIONS
3.3.1 REGULAR SINGLE-CROSSING DOMAINS
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of regular single-crossing domains and provide a
characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on these domains. First, we present
a formal definition of single-crossing domains.
Definition 3.4. A domain Sc is called a single-crossing domain if there is a linear order C on Sc
such that for all x, y 2 X and all P, Pˆ 2 Sc,
[x < y, P C Pˆ, and xPˆy] ) xPy.
Definition 3.5. A single-crossing domain S¯c is called maximal if there is no single-crossing do-
main Sc such that S¯c ( Sc.
In what follows, we provide an example of a maximal regular single-crossing domain with
five alternatives.
Example 3.2. Let X = fx1, x2, x3, x4, x5g, where x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 < x5. Then, the domain D
in Table 2 is a maximal regular single-crossing domain with respect to the linear orderC2 L(D)
given by P1 C P2 C P3 C P4 C P5 C P6 C P7 C P8 C P9 C P10 C P11. To see this, consider
two alternatives, say x2 and x4. Then, x2Px4 for all P 2 fP1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6g and x4Px2 for all
P 2 fP7, P8, P9, P10, P11g. Therefore, x2Pˆx4 for some Pˆ 2 D implies x2Px4 for all P C Pˆ.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11
x1 x2 x2 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5
x2 x1 x3 x3 x3 x2 x4 x4 x3 x5 x4
x3 x3 x1 x4 x4 x4 x2 x5 x5 x3 x3
x4 x4 x4 x1 x5 x5 x5 x2 x2 x2 x2
x5 x5 x5 x5 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1
Table 2: A maximal regular single-crossing domain
In the following two lemmas, we establish two crucial properties of a (maximal) regular single-
crossing domain.
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Lemma 3.1. Every regular single-crossing domain is a single-peaked domain.
Proof. Let Sc be a regular single-crossing domain. LetC2 L(Sc) be such that for all x, y 2 X and
all P, Pˆ 2 Sc,
[x < y, P C Pˆ, and xPˆy] ) xPy.
We show that each P 2 Sc is single-peaked. Without loss of generality, assume for contradiction
that there are u, v 2 X and Q 2 Sc such that u < v < r1(Q) and uQv. Since u < v and uQv, by
the definition of a single-crossing domain, uPv for all P 2 Sc with P C Q. This, in particular,
means r1(P) 6= v for all P 2 Sc with P C Q. Moreover, since v < r1(Q), by the definition of a
single-crossing domain, r1(Q)Pv for all P 2 Sc with Q C P. This, in particular, means r1(P) 6= v
for all P 2 Sc with Q C P. This, together with the fact that r1(Q) 6= v, means r1(P) 6= v for all
P 2 Sc, which is a contradiction to the regularity of Sc. Therefore, Sc is single-peaked. 
Lemma 3.2. Every maximal regular single-crossing domain satisfies the top-connectedness property.
Proof. Let S¯c be a maximal regular single-crossing domain. Then, by Lemma 3.1, S¯c is a regular
single-peaked domain. Take x 2 X n fbg. We show that there exist P, P0 2 S¯c such that r1(P) =
r2(P0) = x and r2(P) = r1(P0) = x + 1. Without loss of generality, assume for contradiction
that for all P 2 S¯c with r1(P) = x, r2(P) 6= x + 1. Because S¯c is single-peaked, if x = a, then
r2(P) = a+ 1 for all P 2 S¯c with r1(P) = a, which is a contradiction. So, assume x 6= a. Because
S¯c is single-peaked and x /2 X n fa, bg, for all P 2 S¯c with r1(P) = x, r2(P) 6= x + 1 implies
r2(P) = x  1. Let C2 L(S¯c) be such that for all u, v 2 X and all P, Pˆ 2 S¯c,
[u < v, P C Pˆ, and uPˆv] ) uPv.
Take Pˆ 2 S¯c with r1(Pˆ) = x such that for all P 2 S¯c with Pˆ C P, r1(P) 6= x. Consider the
preference P˜ with r1(P˜) = x and r2(P˜) = x + 1 such that for all u, v 2 X n fx, x + 1g, uP˜v if
and only if uPˆv. Because r1(P˜) = x and r2(P˜) = x + 1, by our assumption, P˜ /2 S¯c. Therefore,
since S¯c is regular single-crossing, it follows that S¯c [ P˜ is also single-crossing with respect to the
orderingC02 L(S¯c [ P˜), whereC0 is obtained by placing P˜ just after Pˆ in the orderingC, i.e., for
all P, P0 2 S¯c, P C0 P0 if and only if P C P0, and there is no P 2 S¯c with Pˆ C0 P C0 P˜. However,
this contradicts the maximality of S¯c, which completes the proof. 
The following corollaries are obtained from Theorem 3.1, Lemma 3.1, and Lemma 3.2. They
characterize the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on top-connected regular single-crossing
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domains andmaximal regular single-crossing domains. Note that a top-connected regular single-
crossing domain withm alternatives can be constructed with 2m  2 preferences, whereas a max-
imal regular single-crossing domain requires m(m  1)/2 preferences.
Corollary 3.2. Let Sc be a top-connected regular single-crossing domain. Then, an SCF f : Snc ! X is
unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
Corollary 3.3 (Saporiti (2014)). Let S¯c be a maximal regular single-crossing domain. Then, an SCF
f : S¯nc ! X is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
3.3.2 MINIMALLY RICH SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS
In this subsection, we present a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on
minimally rich single-peaked domains. The notion of minimally rich single-peaked domains
is introduced in Peters et al. (2014). For the sake of completeness, we present below a formal
definition of such domains.
Definition 3.6. A single-peaked preference P is called left single-peaked (right single-peaked) if for
all u < r1(P) < v, we have uPv (vPu). Moreover, a single-peaked domain Sm is called minimally
rich if it contains all left and all right single-peaked preferences.
Clearly, a minimally rich single-peaked domain is a top-connected single-peaked domain. So,
we have the following corollary from Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.4. Let Sm be a minimally rich single-peaked domain. Then, an SCF f : Snm ! X is
unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
3.3.3 DISTANCE BASED SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of single-peaked domains that are based on dis-
tances. Consider the situation where a public facility has to be developed at one of the locations
x1, . . . , xm. Suppose that there is a street connecting those locations, and for every two locations
xi and xi+1, there are two types of distances, a forward distance from xi to xi+1 and a backward
distance from xi+1 to xi. An agent bases her preferences on such distances, i.e., whenever a lo-
cation is strictly closer than another to her most preferred location, she prefers the former to the
latter. Moreover, ties are broken on both sides. We show that such a domain is a top-connected
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single-peaked domain under some condition on the distances. Below, we present a formal defi-
nition of such domains.
Consider the directed line graph G = hX, Ei on X. A function d : E ! (0,¥) is called a
distance function on G. Given a distance function d, define the distance between two nodes x, y 2 X
as d(x, y) = d(x, x+ 1) + . . .+ d(y  1, y) if y > x and as d(x, y) = d(x, x  1) + . . .+ d(y+ 1, y)
if y < x. A distance function satisfies adjacent symmetry if d(x, x + 1) = d(x, x   1) for all x 2
X n fa, bg. A preference P respects a distance function d if for all x, y 2 X, d(r1(P), x) < d(r1(P), y)
implies xPy. A domain Sd is called a single-peaked domain based on a distance function d if Sd =
fP 2 L(X) j P respects dg.
Below, we provide an example of a single-peaked domain based on a distance function.
Example 3.3. Let X = fx1, x2, x3, x4, x5g, where x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 < x5. The directed line graph
G = hX, Ei on X and the adjacent symmetric distance function d on E are as given below.
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
1
5
5
2
2
3
3
6
Figure 3: The directed line graph G on X and an adjacent symmetric distance function d on G
Then, the domain in Table 3 is a single-peaked domain based on the distance function d.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
x1 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5
x2 x3 x1 x4 x2 x5 x3 x4
x3 x1 x3 x2 x4 x3 x5 x3
x4 x4 x4 x5 x5 x2 x2 x2
x5 x5 x5 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1
Table 3: A single-peaked domain based on the distance function d
LetG = hX, Ei be the directed line graph on X and let d : E ! (0,¥) be an adjacent symmetric
distance function. Then, it is easy to verify that a single-peaked domain based on the distance
function d is a top-connected single-peaked domain. Therefore, we have the following corollary
from Theorem 3.1.
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Corollary 3.5. Let G = hX, Ei be the directed line graph on X and let d : E ! (0,¥) be an adjacent
symmetric distance function. Let Sd be a single-peaked domain based on the distance function d. Then,
f : Snd ! X is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
4. PARTIALLY SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS
In this section, we consider a class of non-single-peaked domains. These domains exhibit single-
peakedness only over a strict subset of alternatives. We call such domains partially single-
peaked domains which are formally defined below.
Definition 4.1. Let x, y 2 X such that x < y  1. Then, a domain S˜ is called partially single-peaked
with respect to x and y if
(i) for all P 2 S˜ with r1(P) 2 [x, y] and all u, v /2 (x, y),

v < u  r1(P) or r1(P)  u < v

implies uPv,
(ii) for all P 2 S˜ with r1(P) /2 [x, y] and all u, v 2 X such that u /2 (x, y),

v < u 
r1(P) or r1(P)  u < v

implies uPv, and
(iii) there exist Q,Q0 2 S˜ with r1(Q) = x and r1(Q0) = y such that either

r2(Q) 2 (x +
1, y) and r2(Q0) 2 (x, y  1)

or

r2(Q) = y and r2(Q0) = x

.
Condition (i) in Definition 4.1 says that if the top-ranked alternative of a preference in a par-
tially single-peaked domain lies in the interval [x, y], then it maintains single-peakedness over
the intervals [a, x] and [y, b]. Note that this condition does not impose any restriction on the
relative ordering of an alternative in [x, y] and an alternative outside [x, y]. The interpretation of
Condition (ii) is as follows. Consider a preference P in a partially single-peaked domain such
that r1(P) /2 [x, y]. Suppose, for instance, r1(P) 2 [a, x). Then, P maintains single-peakedness
over the interval [a, r1(P)]. Moreover, if an alternative u lies in the interval (r1(P), x] or in the
interval [y, b], then it is preferred to any alternative v in the interval (u, b]. Therefore, in contrast
to Condition (i), Condition (ii) imposes a mild restriction on the relative ordering of an alterna-
tive in [x, y] and an alternative outside [x, y]. Further, both these conditions do not impose any
restriction on the relative ordering of two alternatives in the interval [x, y]. Finally, Condition
(iii) ensures that the intervals [a, x] and [y, b] are the maximal intervals over which every pref-
erence in a partially single-peaked domain maintains single-peakedness. To see this, first note
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that all the preferences in a partially single-peaked domain with respect to x and y maintain
single-peakedness over the intervals [a, x] and [y, b]. This, together with the facts that r1(Q) = x,
r2(Q) > x + 1 and r1(Q0) = y, r2(Q0) < y   1, ensures that the intervals [a, x] and [y, b] are
the maximal intervals with the said property. In Section 4.2, we show that the particular restric-
tions on the second-ranked alternatives of Q and Q0 given in Condition (iii) are necessary for our
results.
We illustrate the notion of partially single-peaked domains in Figure 4. Figure 4(a) and Figure
4(b) present partially single-peaked preferences P with r1(P) 2 [x, y] and r1(P) 2 [a, x), respec-
tively. Figure 4(c) presents the partially single-peaked preferences Q and Q0 with r1(Q) = x,
r2(Q) 2 (x + 1, y), r1(Q0) = y, and r2(Q0) 2 (x, y   1), and Figure 4(d) presents the partially
single-peaked preferences Q and Q0 with r1(Q) = x, r2(Q) = y, r1(Q0) = y, and r2(Q0) = x.
Note that all these preferences are single-peaked over the intervals [a, x] and [y, b]. Furthermore,
for the preference depicted in Figure 4(a), there is no restriction on the ranking of the alternatives
in the interval (x, y), and for that shown in Figure 4(b), there is no restriction on the ranking of
the alternatives in the interval (x, y) except that x is preferred to all the alternatives in (x, b].
Also, for the preferences in Figures 4(c) and 4(d), there is no restriction on the ranking of the
alternatives in (x, y) other than the restriction on the second-ranked alternatives.
In the following, we define a top-connected partially single-peaked domain.
Definition 4.2. A domain S˜ is called a top-connected partially single-peaked domain with respect to
alternatives x and y with x < y  1 if
(i) S˜ is a partially single-peaked domain with respect to x and y, and
(ii) S˜ contains a top-connected single-peaked domain.
We interpret Definition 4.2 in terms of its top-graph. Let G be the top-graph of a top-connected
partially single-peaked domain with respect to alternatives x and y. Then, G is a directed partial
line graph with respect to x and y. To see this, note that G can be written as G1 [ G2, where
G1 = hX, E1i is the directed line graph on X and G2 = h[x, y], E2i is a directed graph such that
(x, r2(Q)), (y, r2(Q0)) 2 E2 where r2(Q) 2 (x+ 1, y] and r2(Q0) 2 [x, y  1). In Example 4.1, we
present a top-connected partially single-peaked domain with seven alternatives, and in Figure 5,
we present the top-graph of that domain.
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a x y br1(P)
(a) Partially single-peaked preference P with r1(P) 2 [x, y]
a x y br1(P)
(b) Partially single-peaked preference P with r1(P) 2 [a, x)
a byr1(Q) = x r2(Q) = x0 a bx r1(Q0) = yr2(Q0) = y0
(c) Partially single-peaked preferences Q,Q0 with x+ 1 < r2(Q) < y and x < r2(Q0) < y  1
a br1(Q) = x r2(Q) = y a br1(Q0) = yr2(Q0) = x
(d) Partially single-peaked preferences Q,Q0 with r2(Q) = y and r2(Q0) = x
Figure 4: Partially single-peaked preferences
Example 4.1. Let X = fx1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7g, where x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 < x5 < x6 < x7. Then,
the domain in Table 4 is a top-connected partially single-peaked domain with respect to x3 and
x6. To see this, first consider a preference with its top-ranked alternative in the interval [x3, x6],
say P7. Note that x3P7x2P7x1 and x6P7x7, which means P7 is single-peaked over the intervals
[x1, x3] and [x6, x7]. Moreover, the position of x5 is completely unrestricted (here at the bottom)
in P7. Next, consider a preference with its top-ranked alternative in the interval [x1, x3], say
P2. Once again, note that P2 is single-peaked over the intervals [x1, x3] and [x6, x7]. Further, x3
is preferred to the alternatives x4, x5, x6, x7, and there is no restriction on the relative ordering
of the alternatives x4 and x5 (here x5P2x4). Finally, consider the preferences Q and Q0. Since
r1(Q) = x3, r2(Q) = x5, r1(Q0) = x6, and r2(Q0) = x4, they satisfy Condition (iii) in Definition
4.1.
The top-graph G of the domain in Example 4.1 is given in Figure 5. Note that G is a partial line
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 Q Q0
x1 x2 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x4 x5 x5 x6 x6 x7 x3 x6
x2 x1 x1 x3 x2 x4 x6 x3 x5 x4 x6 x5 x7 x6 x5 x4
x3 x3 x3 x1 x4 x2 x3 x5 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5 x5 x2 x3
x4 x6 x4 x4 x5 x5 x2 x2 x2 x6 x3 x3 x4 x4 x6 x7
x5 x5 x5 x5 x6 x6 x1 x6 x1 x7 x2 x2 x3 x3 x1 x2
x6 x7 x6 x6 x7 x1 x7 x1 x6 x2 x7 x7 x2 x2 x7 x1
x7 x4 x7 x7 x1 x7 x5 x7 x7 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1 x4 x5
Table 4: A top-connected partially single-peaked domain
graph since it can bewritten asG1[G2, whereG1 is the directed line graph on fx1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7g
and G2 is a directed graph on fx3, x4, x5, x6g having edges (x3, x5) and (x6, x4).
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7
Figure 5: Top-graph of the domain in Example 4.1
4.1 UNANIMOUS AND STRATEGY-PROOF SCFS
In this subsection, we characterize the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on top-connected par-
tially single-peaked domains as partly dictatorial generalized median voter schemes. A formal
definition of such SCFs is presented below:
Definition 4.3. Let x, y 2 X be such that x < y   1. Then, a min-max rule f b : Dn ! X
with parameters b = (bS)SN is a partly dictatorial generalized median voter scheme (PDGMVS)
with respect to x and y if there exists an agent d 2 N, called the partial dictator of f b, such that
bd 2 [a, x] and bNnd 2 [y, b].
REMARK 4.1. Reffgen (2015) defines PDGMVS in a different fashion but it can be shown that
their definition is equivalent to Definition 4.3.10
The following lemma justifies why the agent d in Definition 4.3 is called the partial dictator.
Lemma 4.1. Let x, y 2 X be such that x < y  1 and let f b : Dn ! X be a PDGMVS with respect to x
and y. Suppose agent d is the partial dictator of f b. Then,
(i) f b(PN) 2 [a, x] if r1(Pd) 2 [a, x),
10For details see the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Reffgen (2015).
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(ii) f b(PN) 2 [y, b] if r1(Pd) 2 (y, b], and
(iii) f b(PN) = r1(Pd) if r1(Pd) 2 [x, y].
Proof. First, we prove (i). The proof of (ii) can be established using symmetric arguments. As-
sume for contradiction that r1(Pd) 2 [a, x) and f b(PN) > x. Since f b is a min-max rule, f b is
uncompromising. Therefore, f b(P0d, PNnd) = f
b(PN), where r1(P0d) = a. Again by uncompromis-
ingness, we have f b(P0N)  f b(PN), where r1(P0i ) = b for all i 6= d. Because f b(PN) > x, this
means f b(P0N) > x. However, by the definition of f
b, f b(P0N) = bd. Since bd 2 [a, x], this is a
contradiction. This completes the proof of (i).
Now, we prove (iii). Without loss of generality, assume for contradiction that r1(Pd) 2 [x, y]
and f b(PN) > r1(Pd). Using a similar argument as for the proof of (i), we have f b(P0N)  f b(PN),
where r1(P0d) = a and r1(P
0
i ) = b for all i 6= d. This, in particular, means f b(P0N) > x. Since by the
definition of f b, f b(P0N) = bd and bd 2 [a, x], this is a contradiction. This completes the proof of
(iii). 
The following theorem characterizes the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on top-connected
partially single-peaked domains.
Theorem 4.1. Let x, y 2 X be such that x < y  1 and let S˜ be a top-connected partially single-peaked
domain with respect to x and y. Then, an SCF f : S˜n ! X is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only
if it is a PDGMVS with respect to x and y.
The proof of the Theorem 4.1 is relegated to Appendix B.
Our next corollary is a consequence of Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.1. It characterizes a class
of dictatorial domains, and thereby it generalizes the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite (Gibbard
(1973), Satterthwaite (1975)) results. Note that our dictatorial result is independent of those in
Aswal et al. (2003), Sato (2010), Pramanik (2015), and so on.
Corollary 4.1. Let D be a top-connected partially single-peaked domain with respect to a and b. Then, D
is a dictatorial domain.
4.2 A RESULT ON PARTIAL NECESSITY
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of PDGMVS domains. A formal definition is given
below.
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Definition 4.4. A domainD is called a PDGMVS domain if there are x, y 2 X with x < y  1 such
that
(i) every unanimous and strategy-proof SCF on Dn is a PDGMVS with respect to x and y, and
(ii) every PDGMVS with respect to x and y on Dn is strategy-proof.
Conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) in Definition 4.1 are obviously strong conditions. Are they neces-
sary for PDGMVS domains? The question appears to be extremely difficult to resolve completely.
However, Lemma 4.2 shows that Conditions (i) and (ii) are necessary, and the subsequent dis-
cussion shows that Condition (iii) is also close to being necessary in an appropriate sense.
Lemma 4.2. Let D be a PDGMVS domain. Then, D satisfies Conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition 4.1.
Proof. First, we show that D satisfies Condition (i) in Definition 4.1. Without loss of generality,
assume for contradiction that there exists P˜ 2 D with r1(P˜) 2 [x, y] such that uP˜v for some
u < v  x. Consider the PDGMVS f b : Dn ! X, where
bS =
8>>><>>>:
v if S = f1g,
a if f1g ( S,
b if 1 /2 S.
We show that f b is not strategy-proof. Note that agent 1 is the partial dictator of f b. Consider
the preference profile PN 2 Dn such that r1(P1) = a, P2 = P˜, and r1(Pj) = b for all j 6= 1, 2. Then,
by the definition of f b, f b(PN) = v. Let P02 2 D be such that r1(P02) = u. Again, by the definition
of f b, f b(P02, PNn2) = u. Since uP˜v, this means agent 2 manipulates at PN via P02.
Now, we show that D satisfies Condition (ii) in Definition 4.1. Without loss of generality,
assume for contradiction that there exist P˜ 2 D with r1(P˜) 2 [a, x) and u, v 2 X with u /2 (x, y)
such that

v < u  r1(P) or r1(P)  u < v

and vP˜u. If

v < u  r1(P˜)

and vP˜u, then using
a similar argument as for the proof of the necessity of Condition (i), it follows that there is a
PDGMVS on Dn that is manipulable. So, suppose r1(P˜)  u < v and vP˜u. We distinguish two
cases.
CASE 1. Suppose u  x.
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Consider the PDGMVS f b : Dn ! X, where
bS =
8<: u if 1 2 S and S 6= N,b if 1 /2 S.
We show that f b is not strategy-proof. Let PN 2 Dn be such that P1 = P˜ and r1(Pj) = b for all
j 6= 1. Then, by the definition of f b, f b(PN) = u. Let P01 2 D be such that r1(P01) = v. Again, by
the definition of f b, f b(P01, PNn1) = v. Since vP˜u, agent 1 manipulates at PN via P
0
1.
CASE 2. Suppose x < u.
Since u /2 (x, y), this means y  u. Consider the PDGMVS f b : Dn ! X, where
bS =
8<: a if 1 2 S,u if 1 /2 S and S 6= Æ.
We show that f b is not strategy-proof. Let PN 2 Dn be such that P2 = P˜ and r1(Pj) = b for all
j 6= 2. Then, by the definition of f b, f b(PN) = u. Let P02 2 D be such that r1(P02) = v. Again, by
the definition of f b, f b(P02, PNn2) = v. Since vP˜u, agent 2 manipulates at PN via P02. 
Coming to Condition (iii) in Definition 4.1, it is to be noted that it can be violated in many
ways. We consider those domains obtained through mild violations of the same and show that
there do exist unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on such domains that are not PDGMVS.
Recall that Condition (iii) requires two non-single-peaked preferences Q and Q0 in D such
that r1(Q) = x, r2(Q) = x0, r1(Q0) = y, and r2(Q0) = y0, where either

x0 2 (x+ 1, y) and y0 2
(x, y   1) or x0 = x and y0 = x. Suppose a domain D satisfies Conditions (i) and (ii) in
Definition 4.1. Suppose further that D contains a non-single-peaked preference of the form Q,
but no preference of the formQ0. In the following example, we construct a two-agent unanimous
and strategy-proof SCF on such a domain D that is not a PDGMVS.
Example 4.2. Let X = fx1, x2, x3, x4, x5g, where x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 < x5. By P = x1x2x3x4x5, we
mean a preference P such that x1Px2Px3Px4Px5. Consider the domain as follows:
D =fx1x2x3x4x5, x1x3x4x5x2, x2x1x3x4x5, x2x3x4x5x1, x3x2x1x4x5, x3x4x5x2x1, x4x3x2x1x5,
x4x5x3x2x1, x5x4x3x2x1g.
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Note thatDnfx1x3x4x5x2g is a top-connected single-peaked domain and the preference x1x3x4
x5x2 is of the form Q with x = x1 and x0 = x3. However, there is no preference in D of the form
Q0, that is, for instance, no preference with top-ranked alternative x5 and second-ranked alter-
native in fx2, x3g. In Table 5, we present a two-agent SCF that is unanimous and strategy-proof
but not a PDGMVS.
P1
P2 x1x2x3x4x5 x1x3x4x5x2 x2x1x3x4x5 x2x3x4x5x1 x3x2x1x4x5 x3x4x5x2x1 x4x3x2x1x5 x4x5x3x2x1 x5x4x3x2x1
x1x2x3x4x5 x1 x1 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2
x1x3x4x5x2 x1 x1 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3
x2x1x3x4x5 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2
x2x3x4x5x1 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2
x3x2x1x4x5 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3
x3x4x5x2x1 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3
x4x3x2x1x5 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x4
x4x5x3x2x1 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x4
x5x4x3x2x1 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5
Table 5: A unanimous and strategy-proof SCF which is not a PDGMVS
It is left to the reader to verify that the SCF presented in Table 5 is unanimous and strategy-
proof. Note that it violates tops-onlyness at the preference profiles (x3x4x5x2x1, x1x2x3x4x5) and
(x3x4x5x2x1, x1x3x4x5x2), and hence it is not a PDGMVS.
Now, suppose thatD contains two non-single-peaked preferencesQ andQ0, however, they do
not satisfy Condition (iii) in Definition 4.1 for their second-ranked alternatives. In the following
example, we construct a two-agent unanimous and strategy-proof SCF on such a domain D that
is not a PDGMVS.
Example 4.3. Let X = fx1, x2, x3, x4, x5g, where x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 < x5. Let D be the do-
main given in Example 4.2. Consider the domain D [ fx5x1x4x3x2g. As pointed out in Exam-
ple 4.2, D n fx1x3x4x5x2g is a top-connected single-peaked domain. Although, the preferences
x1x3x4x5x2 and x5x1x4x3x2 are non-single-peaked, they do not satisfy the Condition (iii) in Defi-
nition 4.1 since their second-ranked alternatives are x3 and x1, respectively. In Table 6, we present
a two-agent SCF that is unanimous and strategy-proof but not a PDGMVS.
Note that the restriction of the SCF presented in Table 6 to D2 is same as the SCF presented in
Table 5. It is left to the reader to verify that this SCF is unanimous and strategy-proof. However,
as pointed out in Example 4.2, it violates tops-onlyness, and hence it is not a PDGMVS.
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P1
P2 x1x2x3x4x5 x1x3x4x5x2 x2x1x3x4x5 x2x3x4x5x1 x3x2x1x4x5 x3x4x5x2x1 x4x3x2x1x5 x4x5x3x2x1 x5x4x3x2x1 x5x1x4x3x2
x1x2x3x4x5 x1 x1 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x1
x1x3x4x5x2 x1 x1 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3 x1
x2x1x3x4x5 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2
x2x3x4x5x1 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2
x3x2x1x4x5 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3
x3x4x5x2x1 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3
x4x3x2x1x5 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x4 x4
x4x5x3x2x1 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x4 x4
x5x4x3x2x1 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5 x5
x5x1x4x3x2 x1 x1 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5 x5
Table 6: A unanimous and strategy-proof SCF which is not a PDGMVS
4.3 APPLICATIONS
4.3.1 MULTIPLE SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAIN
In this subsection, we consider a well-known class of domains called multiple single-peaked
domains and present a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on such do-
mains. However, before formally defining such domains, we introduce the notion of a single-
peaked domain with respect to an arbitrary order over X.
Definition 4.5. Let 2 L(X) be a prior order over X. Then, a preference P 2 L(X) is single-
peaked with respect to  if for all x, y 2 X, [x  y  r1(P) or r1(P)  y  x] implies yPx.
A domain S is called a single-peaked domain with respect to  if each preference in it is single-
peaked with respect to , and a domain S¯ is called maximal single-peaked with respect to  if it
contains all single-peaked preferences with respect to .
Definition 4.6. Let L = f1, . . . ,qg, where k2 L(X) for all 1  k  q, be a set of q prior
orders over X. Then, a domain is called a multiple single-peaked domain with respect to L, denoted
by SL, if SL =
[
k2f1,...,qg
S¯k , where S¯k is the maximal single-peaked domain with respect to the
prior order k. A multiple single-peaked domain with respect to L is called trivial if S¯ = S¯0
for all ,02 L.
For ease of presentation, for any multiple single-peaked domain with respect to L, we assume
without loss of generality that the integer ordering < is in the set L.
Definition 4.7. Let SL be a non-trivial multiple single-peaked domain with respect to a set of
prior orders L. Then, alternatives u, v 2 X with u < v  1 are called break-points of SL if
(i) for all preferences P 2 SL and all c, d 2 X n (u, v),

d < c  r1(P) or r1(P)  c < d

implies
cPd, and
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(ii) there exist P, P0 2 SL such that r1(P) = u, r2(P) 2 (u + 1, v], r1(P0) = v, and r2(P0) 2
[u, v  1).
REMARK 4.2. Let u and v be the break-points of a non-trivial multiple single-peaked domain
SL. Then, u, v induce the partition fXL,XM,XRg of X, where XL = [a, u), XM = [u, v], and
XR = (v, b]. Reffgen (2015) calls such a partition the maximal common decomposition of X and
the sets XL, XM, and XR as the left component, the middle component, and the right component of
alternatives, respectively.
In the following, we illustrate the notion of break-points of a non-trivial multiple single-
peaked domain by means of an example.
Example 4.4. Let X = fx1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7g be the set of alternatives. Consider the set of prior
ordersL = f<,1,2,3g, where<= x1x2x3x4x5x6x7,1= x1x2x3x5x4x6x7,2= x1x2x5x4x3x6
x7, and 3= x1x2x4x3x5x6x7. Let SL be the multiple single-peaked domain with respect to L.
Clearly, SL is non-trivial since S¯1 6= S¯2 . We claim u = x2 and v = x6 are the break points
of SL. It is easy to verify that SL satisfies Condition (i) in Definition 4.7. For Condition (ii),
consider the preferences P, P0 2 S¯2  SL such that r1(P) = x2, r2(P) = x5, r1(P0) = x6,
and r2(P0) = x3. Finally, the maximal common decomposition of X is given by XL = fx1g,
XM = fx2, x3, x4, x5, x6g, and XR = fx7g.
Note that a non-trivial multiple single-peaked domain with break-points u and v is a top-
connected partially single-peaked domain with respect to u and v. Thus, we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.2 (Reffgen (2015)). Let SL be a non-trivial multiple single-peaked domain with break-points
u and v. Then, an SCF f : SnL ! X is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a PDGMVS with
respect to u and v.
4.3.2 SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS ON GRAPHS
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of single-peaked domains on graphs. All the graphs
we consider in this subsection are undirected.
Definition 4.8. A path in an undirected graph G = hX, Ei from a node x to a node y, denoted
by pG(x, y), is defined as a sequence of nodes (x1, . . . , xk) such that fxi, xi+1g 2 E for all i =
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1, . . . , k  1. An undirected graph G = hX, Ei is called connected if for all x, y 2 X, there is a path
from x to y.
Definition 4.9. An undirected graph G = hX, Ei is called a tree if for every two distinct nodes
x, y 2 X, there is a unique path from x to y. A spanning tree of an undirected connected graph G
is defined as a connected subgraph of G that is a tree. For an undirected connected graph G, we
denote by TG the set of all spanning trees of G.
Definition 4.10. Let T = hX, Ei be a tree. Then, a domain is called single-peaked with respect to T,
denoted by ST, if for all P 2 ST and all distinct x, y 2 X,
[x 2 pT(r1(P), y)] =) [xPy].
Definition 4.11. Let G = hX, Ei be an undirected connected graph. Then, a domain is called
single-peaked with respect to G, denoted by SG, if SG = [T2TGST.
Note that if T is the undirected line graph on X, then ST is the maximal single-peaked domain.
In Lemma 4.3, we show that if a domain is single-peaked with respect to an undirected partial
line graph, then it is a top-connected partially single-peaked domain.
Lemma 4.3. Let x < y  1 and let G be an undirected partial line graph with respect to x and y. Then,
SG is a top-connected partially single-peaked domain with respect to x and y.
Proof. Let G be an undirected partial line graph with respect to x and y with x < y   1. We
show that SG is a top-connected partially single-peaked domain. Let G = G1 [ G2, where G1 =
hX, E1i is the undirected line graph on X and G2 = h[x, y], E2i is an undirected graph such that
fx, x0g, fy, y0g 2 E2 for some x0 2 (x+ 1, y] and y0 2 [x, y  1).
First, we show that SG is partially single-peaked, that is, SG satisfies Conditions (i), (ii), and
(iii) in Definition 4.1. Take P 2 SG with r1(P) 2 [x, y] and take u, v 2 X n (x, y). Suppose
[v < u  r1(P) or r1(P)  u < v]. Consider an arbitrary spanning tree T of G. Then, by the
definition of G, u 2 pT(r1(P), v), and hence uPv. Therefore, SG satisfies Condition (i). Using
a similar argument, it can be shown that SG satisfies Condition (ii). Now, we show that there
are Q,Q0 2 SG satisfying Condition (iii). Consider the tree T = hX, Ei such that E = (E1 n
fx, x+ 1g) [ fx, x0g. Since G1 = hX, E1i is the undirected line graph on X, T is a spanning tree
of G. Because fx, x0g 2 E, there is a preference Q 2 ST  SG with r1(Q) = x and r2(Q) = x0.
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Similarly, there is a preference Q0 2 SG with r1(Q0) = y and r2(Q0) = y0. If x0 6= y and y0 6= x,
then clearly Q and Q0 satisfy Condition (iii). On the other hand, if, for instance, x0 = y, then that
means there is an edge fx, yg in G, and consequently, y0 can be chosen as x. Thus, Condition (iii)
is satisfied.
Now, we show that SG contains a top-connected single-peaked domain. Since G1 is the undi-
rected line graph on X, SG1 is the maximal single-peaked domain. Moreover, since G1 is a span-
ning tree of G, SG1  SG. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Combining Theorem 4.1 with Lemma 4.3 leads immediately to the following characterization
of the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on a single-peaked domain with respect to an undi-
rected partial line graph.
Corollary 4.3. Let x, y 2 X be such that x < y  1 and let G = hX, Ei be an undirected partial line
graph with respect to x and y. Suppose SG is the single-peaked domain with respect to G. Then, an SCF
f : SnG ! X is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a PDGMVS.
5. GROUP STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
In this section, we consider group strategy-proofness and obtain a characterization of the unani-
mous and group strategy-proof SCFs on top-connected single-peaked domains and top-connected
partially single-peaked domains. We begin with the definition of group strategy-proofness.
Definition 5.1. An SCF f : Dn ! X is called group manipulable if there is a preference profile PN,
a non-empty coalition C  N, and a preference profile P0C 2 DjCj of the agents in C such that
f (P0C, PNnC)Pi f (PN) for all i 2 C. An SCF f : Dn ! X is called group strategy-proof if it is not
group manipulable.
Barbera` et al. (2010) establishes a sufficient condition on a domain that ensures the equiva-
lence of strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness on that domain. It can be easily veri-
fied that top-connected single-peaked domains satisfy their sufficient condition. Thus, we have
the following corollary.
Corollary 5.1. Let Sˆ be a top-connected single-peaked domain. Then, an SCF f : Sˆn ! X is unanimous
and group strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
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In the following theorem, we present a characterization of the unanimous and group strategy-
proof SCFs on top-connected partially single-peaked domains. It is worth mentioning that these
domains do not satisfy the sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and
group strategy-proofness provided in Barbera` et al. (2010).
Theorem 5.1. Let x, y 2 X be such that x < y  1 and let S˜ be a top-connected partially single-peaked
domain with respect to x and y. Then, an SCF f : S˜n ! X is unanimous and group strategy-proof if and
only if it is a PDGMVS with respect to x and y.
Proof. Let x, y 2 X be such that x < y  1 and let S˜ be a top-connected partially single-peaked
domain with respect to x and y. Suppose f : S˜n ! X is a PDGMVS with respect to x and y
where agent d is the partial dictator. It is enough to show that f is group strategy-proof. Clearly,
no group can manipulate f at a preference profile PN 2 S˜n where r1(Pd) 2 [x, y]. Consider a
preference profile PN 2 S˜n such that r1(Pd) 2 [a, x). We show that f is group strategy-proof
at PN. Since r1(Pd) 2 [a, x), by the definition of PDGMVS, f (PN) 2 [a, x]. Let C0 = fi 2 N j
r1(Pi)  f (PN)g and C00 = fi 2 N j r1(Pi) > f (PN)g. Suppose a coalition C manipulates f at
PN. Then, there is P0C 2 S˜ jCj such that f (P0C, PNnC)Pi f (PN) for all i 2 C. If f (P0C, PNnC) < f (PN),
then by the definition of S˜ , we have C \ C00 = Æ. However, by the definition of PDGMVS,
f (P0C, PNnC)  f (PN) for all C  C0 and all P0C 2 S˜ jCj, a contradiction. Again, if f (P0C, PNnC) >
f (PN), then by the definition of S˜ , we have C \C0 = Æ. However, by the definition of PDGMVS,
f (P0C, PNnC)  f (PN) for all C  C00 and all P0C 2 S˜ jCj, a contradiction. The proof for the case
where r1(Pd) 2 (y, b] follows from a symmetric argument. 
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a class of restricted domains which we call top-connected
single-peaked domains and have characterized the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on such
domains as min-max rules. Outstanding examples of top-connected single-peaked domains are
maximal single-peaked domains, minimally rich single-peaked domains, distance based single-
peaked domains, and top-connected regular single-crossing domains. Further, we have intro-
duced the notion of min-max domains for which the set of unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs
coincides with that of min-max rules. We have shown that a domain is a min-max domain if and
only if it is a top-connected single-peaked domain.
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Next, we have considered domains that violate single-peakedness over a subset of alterna-
tives. We call such domains top-connected partially single-peaked domains. We have shown
that an SCF is unanimous and strategy-proof on such a domain if and only if it is a PDGMVS.
Outstanding examples of top-connected partially single-peaked domains are multiple single-
peaked domains and single-peaked domains on graphs.
Finally, we have considered group strategy-proofness and have shown that strategy-proofness
and group strategy-proofness are equivalent on top-connected single-peaked and top-connected
partially single-peaked domains.
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
Proof. (If part) Let Sˆ be a top-connected single-peaked domain and suppose f b : Sˆn ! X is a
min-max rule. Then, f b is unanimous by definition. Let S¯ be the maximal single-peaked domain.
By (Weymark (2011)), f b : S¯n ! X is strategy-proof. Since Sˆ  S¯ , f b is strategy-proof on Sˆn.
This completes the proof of the if part.
(Only-if part) Let f : Sˆn ! X be a unanimous and strategy-proof SCF. We show that f is a
min-max rule. First, we establish a few properties of f in the following sequence of lemmas.
Lemma A.1 shows that the outcome of f at every preference profile PN 2 Sˆn must lie in-
between min(t(PN)) and max(t(PN)).
Lemma A.1. It must be that f (PN) 2 [min(t(PN)), max(t(PN))] for all PN 2 Sˆn.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that f (PN) /2 [min(t(PN)),max(t(PN))] for some PN 2 Sˆn. With-
out loss of generality, assume that f (PN) = x < min(t(PN)). Then, f (PN) = x < x + 1 
min(t(PN))  r1(Pi) for all i 2 N. Since Pi is single-peaked, this means (x+ 1)Pix for all i 2 N.
For each i 2 N, consider P0i 2 Sˆ such that r1(P0i ) = x + 1 and r2(P0i ) = x. Then, by strategy-
proofness, f (P0i , PNni) = x. By moving the agents i 2 N from the preference Pi to the preference
P0i one-by-one and applying strategy-proofness at every step, we have f (PN) = f (P
0
1, PNn1) =
f (P01, P
0
2, PNnf1,2g) = . . . = f (P01, . . . , P
0
n 1, Pn) = x. However, by unanimity, f (P
0
1, . . . , P
0
n) = x+ 1.
This means agent n manipulates at (P01, . . . , P
0
n 1, Pn) via P
0
n, a contradiction. This completes the
proof of the lemma. 
Lemma A.2 and Corollary A.1 establish a restricted version of uncompromisingness. The
implication of the lemma is as follows. Consider a preference profile PN. Fix an alternative
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y 2 X. Construct another preference profile P0N where each agent with top-ranked alternative
at PN on the left (right) of y move to a preference with top-ranked alternative y, while all other
agents keep their preferences unchanged. Then, (i) if f (PN) was on the right (left) of y, then
f (P0N) = f (PN), and (ii) if f (PN) was on the left (right) of y, then f (P
0
N) = y.
Lemma A.2. Let PN, P0N 2 Sˆn and y 2 X be such that for all i 2 N, if r1(Pi) < y then r1(P0i ) = y,
otherwise Pi = P0i . Then, f (P
0
N) = maxf f (PN), yg.
Proof. Suppose f (PN) = x. We distinguish two cases based on the relative positions of x and y.
CASE 1. Suppose that y  x.
Note that if y  min(t(PN)), then P0N = PN, and hence by Lemma A.1, y  x. Therefore,
there is nothing to prove. Suppose min(t(PN)) < y. Let i 2 N be such that r1(Pi) = min(t(PN)).
Take P0i 2 Sˆ such that r1(P0i ) = y. We show that f (P0i , PNni) = x. Suppose f (P0i , PNni) > x. Since
P0i is single-peaked and r1(P
0
i )  x < f (P0i , PNni), it must be that xP0i f (P0i , PNni). This means
agent i manipulates at (P0i , PNni) via Pi, a contradiction. Now suppose f (P
0
i , PNni) < x. Since
r1(Pi) < r1(P0i ), it must be that min(t(PN))  min(t(P0i , PNni)). Because r1(Pi) = min(t(PN))
and min(t(PN))  min(t(P0i , PNni)), by Lemma A.1, it follows that r1(Pi)  f (P0i , PNni). Since
Pi is single-peaked and r1(Pi)  f (P0i , PNni) < x, we have f (P0i , PNni)Pix. This means agent i ma-
nipulates at PN via P0i , a contradiction. Therefore, f (P
0
i , PNni) = x. Now, if y  min(t(P0i , PNni)),
then by the assumption of the lemma, P0N = (P
0
i , PNni), and hence the proof is complete. Suppose
min(t(P0i , PNni)) < y. Consider j 2 N such that r1(Pj) = min(t(P0i , PNni)). Let P0j be such that
r1(P0j ) = y. Using a similar argument as before, it follows that f (P
0
i , P
0
j , PNnfi,jg) = f (P
0
i , PNni) =
x. Continuing in this manner, we have f (P0N) = x. This completes the proof of the lemma for
Case 1.
CASE 2. Suppose that x < y.
Let y = x+ k for some positive integer k. Suppose Nx = fi 2 N j r1(Pi)  xg. Let PˆN 2 Sˆn
be such that r1(Pˆi) = x for all i 2 Nx and Pˆi = Pi for all i 2 N n Nx. By strategy-proofness,
f (PˆN) = x. Suppose P¯ 2 Sˆ is such that r1(P¯) = x + 1 and r2(P¯) = x. Take i 2 Nx and let
P¯i = P¯. Then, by strategy-proofness, f (P¯i, PˆNni) 2 fx, x + 1g as otherwise agent i manipulates
at (P¯i, PˆNni) via Pˆi. Using a similar argument, f (P¯i, P¯j, PˆNnfi,jg) 2 fx, x + 1g, where i, j 2 Nx
and P¯j = P¯. Continuing in this manner, we have f (P¯N) 2 fx, x + 1g, where P¯i = P¯ for all
i 2 Nx and P¯i = Pˆi for all i 2 N n Nx. However, min(t(P¯N)) = x + 1. Hence, by Lemma A.1,
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f (P¯N) = x+ 1. Suppose Nx+1 = fi 2 N j r1(Pi)  x+ 1g. Let P˜ 2 Sˆ be such that r1(P˜) = x+ 2
and r2(P˜) = x+ 1. Further, let P˜N 2 Sˆn be such that P˜i = P˜ if i 2 Nx+1, and P˜i = P¯i for all other
agents. Then, by using a similar argument as before, we have f (P˜N) = x+ 2. Continuing in this
manner, we have f (P0N) = x+ k, which completes the proof of the lemma for Case 2.
Since Cases 1 and 2 are exhaustive, this completes the proof of the lemma. 
Corollary A.1. Let PN, P0N 2 Sˆn and y 2 X be such that for all i 2 N, if r1(Pi) > y then r1(P0i ) = y,
otherwise Pi = P0i . Then, f (P
0
N) = minf f (PN), yg.
Our next lemma shows that f is uncompromising.11
Lemma A.3. The SCF f is uncompromising.
Proof. Let PN 2 Sˆn, i 2 N, and P0i 2 Sˆ be such that r1(Pi) < f (PN) and r1(P0i )  f (PN). It is
sufficient to show f (P0i , PNni) = f (PN). Suppose f (PN) = x, r1(Pi) = y, and r1(P
0
i ) = y
0. Assume
for contradiction that f (P0i , PNni) = x
0 6= x. By strategy-proofness, it must be that x0 < y as
otherwise agent i manipulates either at PN via P0i or at (P
0
i , PNni) via Pi. Consider P¯N 2 Sˆn such
that r1(P¯j) = y for all j 2 N with r1(Pj)  y, and P¯j = Pj for all other agents. Since f (PN) = x,
by Lemma A.2, we have f (P¯N) = maxfx, yg = x. On the other hand, since f (P0i , PNni) = x0, by
Lemma A.2, we have f (P¯N) = maxfx0, yg = y, a contradiction. This completes the proof of the
lemma. 
The following lemma establishes that f is a min-max rule.
Lemma A.4. The SCF f is a min-max rule.
Proof. For all S  N, let (PaS , PbNnS) 2 Sˆn be such that r1(Pai ) = a for all i 2 S and r1(Pbi ) = b for
all i 2 N n S. Define bS = f (PaS , PbNnS) for all S  N. Clearly, bS 2 X for all S  N. By unanimity,
b? = b and bN = a. Also, by uncompromisingness, bS  bT for all T  S.
Take PN 2 Sˆn. We show f (PN) = min
SN
fmax
i2S
fr1(Pi), bSgg. Suppose S1 = fi 2 N j r1(Pi) <
f (PN)g, S2 = fi 2 N j f (PN) < r1(Pi)g, and S3 = fi 2 N j r1(Pi) = f (PN)g. By uncompromis-
ingness, bS1[S3  f (PN)  bS1 . Consider the expression minSNfmaxi2S fr1(Pi), bSgg. Take S  S1.
Then, by Condition (iii) in Definition 2.11, bS1  bS. Since r1(Pi) < f (PN) for all i 2 S and
11Since every SCF satisfying uncompromisingness is tops-only, Lemma A.3 shows that a top-connected single-
peaked domain is a tops-only domain. It can be easily verified that top-connected single-peaked domains fail to
satisfy the sufficient conditions for a domain to be tops-only identified in Chatterji and Sen (2011) and Chatterji and
Zeng (2015).
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f (PN)  bS1  bS, we have maxi2S fr1(Pi), bSg = bS. Clearly, for all S  N such that S \ S2 6= ?,
we have max
i2S
fr1(Pi), bSg > f (PN). Consider S  N such that S \ S2 = ? and S \ S3 6= ?.
Then, S  S1 [ S3, and hence bS1[S3  bS. Therefore, maxi2S fr1(Pi), bSg = maxf f (PN), bSg 
maxf f (PN), bS1[S3g. Since bS1[S3  f (PN), we have maxf f (PN), bS1[S3g = f (PN). Combining
all these, we have min
SN
fmax
i2S
fr1(Pi), bSgg = minf f (PN), bS1g. Because f (PN)  bS1 , we have
minf f (PN), bS1g = f (PN). This completes the proof of the lemma. 
The proof of the only-if part of Theorem 3.1 follows from Lemmas A.1 - A.4. 
APPENDIX B. PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
Proof. (If part) Let x, y 2 X be such that x < y  1 and let f b be a PDGMVS on S˜n with respect
to x and y. Then, f b is unanimous by definition. We show that f b is strategy-proof. Let d
be the partial dictator of f b. If r1(Pd) 2 [x, y], then f b(PN) = r1(Pd), and hence f b cannot be
manipulated at a preference profile PN 2 S˜n. Take PN 2 S˜n such that r1(Pd) 2 [a, x). Then,
by Lemma 4.1, f b(PN) 2 [a, x]. Take i 2 N such that r1(Pi)  f b(PN). By the definition of f b,
f b(P0i , PNni)  f b(PN) for all P0i 2 S˜ . Since f b(PN)  x, by the definition of a top-connected
partially single-peaked domain, r1(Pi)  f b(PN)means f b(PN)Piz for all z > f b(PN). Therefore,
agent i cannot manipulate f b at PN. By a symmetric argument, agent i cannot manipulate f b at
a preference profile where r1(Pi)  f b(PN). Using a similar argument, it follows that f b cannot
be manipulated at a preference profile PN with r1(Pd) 2 (y, b]. This completes the proof of the if
part.
(Only-if part) Let x, y 2 X be such that x < y  1 and let S˜ be a top-connected partially single-
peaked domain with respect to x and y. Suppose f : S˜n ! X is a unanimous and strategy-proof
SCF. We show that f is a PDGMVS with respect to x and y. Let Sˆ be a top-connected single-
peaked domain contained in S˜ . Such a domain must exist by Definition 4.2. By Theorem 3.1,
f restricted to Sˆn must be a min-max rule. We establish a few properties of f in the following
sequence of lemmas.
Our next lemma shows that f satisfies tops-onlyness for a particular type of preference pro-
files. It says the following. Let c be an arbitrary alternative. Consider a preference profile PN
such that for all i 2 N, Pi is single-peaked and r1(Pi) 2 fx, cg. Suppose the outcome of f at PN is
c. Consider a top-equivalent preference profile P0N where the agents with top-ranked alternative
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c do not change their preferences. Then, the outcome of f at P0N must be c.
Lemma B.1. Let Æ ( S ( N and let c 2 X. Suppose (PS, PNnS) 2 Sˆn and (P0S, PNnS) 2 S˜n are two
tops-equivalent preference profiles such that r1(Pi) = x for all i 2 S, and r1(Pj) = c for all j 2 N n S.
Then, f (PS, PNnS) = c implies f (P0S, PNnS) = c.
Proof. Take S such that Æ ( S ( N. We prove the lemma using induction on jc  xj. By unanim-
ity, the lemma holds for c = x. Suppose the lemma holds for all c such that jc  xj  k. We prove
the lemma for all c such that jc  xj = k+ 1. Take c such that jc  xj = k+ 1. Let (PS, PNnS) 2 Sˆn
and (P0S, PNnS) 2 S˜n be two tops-equivalent preference profiles such that r1(Pi) = x for all i 2 S,
and r1(Pj) = c for all j 2 N n S. Suppose f (PS, PNnS) = c. We show f (P0S, PNnS) = c. We show
this for x < c, the proof for the case x > c is similar. Since x < c and jc   xj = k + 1, we
have c = x + k + 1. Let (PS, PˆNnS) 2 Sˆn be such that r1(Pˆj) = x + k and r2(Pˆj) = x + k + 1
for all j 2 N n S. Because f is a min-max rule on Sˆn and f (PS, PNnS) = x + k + 1, we have
f (PS, PˆNnS) = x+ k. Since (PS, PˆNnS) and (P0S, PˆNnS) are tops-equivalent and r1(Pˆj) = x+ k for all
j 2 N n S, we have by the induction hypothesis, f (P0S, PˆNnS) = x+ k. For all j 2 N n S, let P¯j 2 Sˆ
be such that r1(P¯j) = x + k + 1 and r2(P¯j) = x + k. Since f (P0S, PˆNnS) = x + k, by moving the
agents j 2 N n S from Pˆj to P¯j one-by-one and applying strategy-proofness at every step, we have
f (P0S, P¯NnS) 2 fx + k, x + k + 1g. We claim f (P0S, P¯NnS) = x + k + 1. Assume for contradiction
that f (P0S, P¯NnS) = x+ k. Recall that Pi 2 Sˆ for all i 2 S. Since (x+ k)Pi(x+ k+ 1) for all i 2 S,
by moving the agents i 2 S from P0i to Pi one-by-one and applying strategy-proofness at every
step, we have f (PS, P¯NnS)  x+ k. Since r1(Pj) = r1(P¯j) = x+ k+ 1 for all j 2 N n S, by strategy-
proofness, f (PS, PNnS) 6= x+ k+ 1. This contradicts our assumption that f (PS, PNnS) = x+ k+ 1.
Therefore, f (P0S, P¯NnS) = x+ k+ 1. Since r1(Pj) = r1(P¯j) = x+ k+ 1 for all j 2 N n S, we have
by strategy-proofness, f (P0S, PNnS) = x+ k+ 1. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Corollary B.1. Let Æ ( S ( N and let c 2 X. Suppose (PS, PNnS) 2 Sˆn and (P0S, PNnS) 2 S˜n are two
tops-equivalent preference profiles such that r1(Pi) = y for all i 2 S, and r1(Pj) = c for all j 2 N n S.
Then, f (PS, PNnS) = c implies f (P0S, PNnS) = c.
Our next lemma shows that the outcome of f at a boundary preference profile cannot be
strictly in-between x and y.12
Lemma B.2. Let PN 2 S˜n be such that r1(Pi) 2 fa, bg for all i 2 N. Then, f (PN) /2 (x, y).
12A boundary preference profile is one where the top-ranked alternative of each agent is either a or b.
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Proof. Assume for contradiction that f (PN) = z 2 (x, y) for some PN 2 S˜n such that r1(Pi) 2
fa, bg for all i 2 N. Let S = fi 2 N j r1(Pi) = ag. Then, it must be that Æ ( S ( N as otherwise
we are done by unanimity. Let r2(Q) = x0 and r2(Q0) = y0, where Q,Q0 2 S˜ are as given in
Condition (iii) of Definition 4.1. We distinguish three cases based on the relative positions of x0,
y0, and z.
CASE 1. Suppose x0 2 (x+ 1, y  1), y0 2 (x+ 1, y  1), and z 2 (x, y0] [ [x0, y).
We consider the case where z 2 (x, y0], the proof for the case where z 2 [x0, y) follows from
a symmetric argument. Let P0N 2 Sˆn be such that r1(P0i ) = y0 for all i 2 S, and r1(P0j ) = y  1,
r2(P0j ) = y for all j 2 N n S. Further, let PˆN 2 Sˆn be such that r1(Pˆi) = x for all i 2 S and
r1(Pˆj) = x + 1 for all j 2 N n S. Because f is a min-max rule on Sˆn and f (PS, PNnS) = z, we
have f (P0S, P
0
NnS) = y
0 and f (PˆS, PˆNnS) = x+ 1. As f (PˆS, PˆNnS) = x+ 1, by Lemma B.1, we have
f (QS, PˆNnS) = x + 1, where Qi = Q for all i 2 S. Consider the preference profile (Q0S, P0NnS),
where Q0i = Q
0 for all i 2 S. Note that f (P0S, P0NnS) = y0, r1(Q0) = y, and r2(Q0) = y0. Therefore,
by moving the agents i 2 S from P0i to Q0 one-by-one and using strategy-proofness at every
step, we have f (Q0S, P
0
NnS) 2 fy, y0g. We claim f (Q0S, P0NnS) = y. Assume for contradiction that
f (Q0S, P
0
NnS) = y
0. Since yP0jy
0 for all j 2 N n S, by moving the agents j 2 N n S from P0j to Q0 one-
by-one and applying strategy-proofness at every step, we have f (Q0S,Q
0
NnS) 6= y. However, this
contradicts unanimity. So, f (Q0S, P
0
NnS) = y. For all i 2 S, let P˜i 2 Sˆ be such that r1(P˜i) = y. By
strategy-proofness, f (P˜S, P0NnS) = y. Since f is a min-max rule on Sˆn, this means f (P˜S, PˆNnS) = y.
For all i 2 S, let P˜0i 2 Sˆ be such that r1(P˜0i ) = x0. Because (P˜S, PˆNnS), (P˜0S, PˆNnS) 2 Sˆn and f is
a min-max rule on Sˆn, f (P˜S, PˆNnS) = y implies f (P˜0S, PˆNnS) = x0. Because f (P˜0S, PˆNnS) = x0,
r1(Q) = x, and r2(Q) = x0, by moving the agents i 2 S from P˜0i to Q one-by-one and applying
strategy-proofness at every step, we have f (QS, PˆNnS) 2 fx, x0g. Since fx+ 1g \ fx, x0g = Æ by
our assumption, this is a contradiction to our earlier finding f (QS, PˆNnS) = x+ 1. This completes
the proof of the lemma for Case 1.
CASE 2. Suppose x0 2 (x+ 1, y  1), y0 2 (x+ 1, y  1), y0 < x0   1, and z 2 (y0, x0).
Let P0N, PˆN 2 Sˆn be such that r1(P0i ) = x0 and r1(Pˆi) = x for all i 2 S, and r1(P0j ) = y and
r1(Pˆj) = y0 for all j 2 N n S. Because f is a min-max rule on Sˆn and f (PS, PNnS) = z, we
have f (P0S, P
0
NnS) = x
0 and f (PˆS, PˆNnS) = y0. As f (PˆS, PˆNnS) = y0, by Lemma B.1, we have
f (QS, PˆNnS) = y0, where Qi = Q for all i 2 S. Again, as f (P0S, P0NnS) = x0, by Corollary B.1, we
have f (P0S,Q
0
NnS) = x
0, where Q0j = Q
0 for all j 2 N n S. Because f (QS, PˆNnS) = y0, r1(Q0) = y,
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and r2(Q0) = y0, by moving the agents j 2 N n S from Pˆj to Q0 one-by-one and using strategy-
proofness at every step, we have f (QS,Q0NnS) 2 fy, y0g. Again, because f (P0S,Q0NnS) = x0,
r1(Q) = x, and r2(Q) = x0, by moving the agents i 2 S from P0i to Q one-by-one and using
strategy-proofness at every step, we have f (QS,Q0NnS) 2 fx, x0g. Since fx, x0g \ fy, y0g = Æ by
our assumption, this is a contradiction. This completes the proof of the lemma for Case 2.
CASE 3. Suppose x0 = y, y0 = x, and z 2 (y0, x0).
Let P0N 2 Sˆn be such that r1(P0i ) = x for all i 2 S and r1(P0j ) = y for all j 2 N n S. Because
f is a min-max rule on Sˆn and f (PS, PNnS) = z, we have f (P0S, P0NnS) = z. Take i 2 N and
consider the preference profile (Qi, P0Sni, P
0
NnS), where Qi = Q. Since r1(P
0
i ) = r1(Qi) = x and
f (P0S, P
0
NnS) 6= x, by strategy-proofness, f (Qi, P0Sni, P0NnS) 6= x. Continuing in this manner, it
follows that f (QS, P0NnS) 6= x, where Qi = Q for all i 2 S. Moreover, since r2(Qi) = y for all
i 2 S and r1(P0j ) = y for all j 2 N n S, by unanimity and strategy-proofness, f (QS, P0NnS) 2
fx, yg. Since f (QS, P0NnS) 6= x, this means f (QS, P0NnS) = y. Let Q0j = Q0 for all j 2 N n S. As
f (QS, P0NnS) = y and r1(Q
0) = y, by strategy-proofness, f (QS,Q0NnS) = y. Now, if we first move
the agents j 2 N n S from P0j to Q0 and then move the agents i 2 S from P0i to Q, then it follows
from a similar argument that f (QS,Q0NnS) = x. Since x 6= y, this is a contradiction to our earlier
finding that f (QS,Q0NnS) = y. This completes the proof of the lemma for Case 3.
Since Cases 1, 2 and 3 are exhaustive, this completes the proof of the lemma. 
Let (bS)SN be the parameters of f restricted to Sˆn. In Lemma B.3 and Lemma B.4, we estab-
lish a few properties of these parameters.
Lemma B.3. For all S  N, bS 2 [a, x] if and only if bNnS 2 [y, b].
Proof. Take S  N. It is enough to show that bS 2 [a, x] implies bNnS 2 [y, b]. Assume for
contradiction that bS, bNnS 2 [a, x]. Let Q0 2 S˜ with r1(Q0) = y be as given in Condition (iii)
of Definition 4.1. Suppose r2(Q0) = y0. Take z 2 (y0, y). Let (PS, PNnS) 2 Sˆn be such that
r1(Pi) = a for all i 2 S and r1(Pj) = b for all j 2 N n S. Since f restricted to Sˆn is a min-max rule,
f (PS, PNnS) = bS 2 [a, x]. Let (P0S, P0NnS) 2 Sˆn be such that r1(P0i ) = y0 for all i 2 S and r1(P0j ) = z
for all j 2 N n S. Since f (PS, PNnS) 2 [a, x], by uncompromisingness of f restricted to Sˆn, we
have f (P0S, P
0
NnS) = y
0. Because r1(Q0) = y and r2(Q0) = y0, by moving the agents i 2 S one-by-
one from P0i to Q
0 and applying strategy-proofness at every step, we have f (Q0S, P
0
NnS) 2 fy, y0g,
where Q0i = Q
0 for all i 2 S.
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Now, let (P¯S, P¯NnS) 2 Sˆn be such that r1(P¯i) = b for all i 2 S and r1(P¯j) = a for all j 2 N n S.
Again, since f restricted to Sˆn is a min-max rule, f (P¯S, P¯NnS) = bNnS 2 [a, x]. Recall that for
j 2 N n S, P0j 2 Sˆ with r1(P0j ) = z. Consider (P00S , P0NnS) 2 Sˆn such that r1(P00i ) = y for all i 2 S.
Since f (P¯S, P¯NnS) 2 [a, x], by uncompromisingness of f restricted to Sˆn, we have f (P00S , P0NnS) = z.
Because r1(P00i ) = y = r1(Q
0) for all i 2 S, by Corollary B.1, it follows that f (Q0S, P0NnS) = z.
However, as z /2 fy, y0g, this is a contradiction to our earlier finding that f (Q0S, P0NnS) 2 fy, y0g.
This completes the proof of the lemma. 
The following lemma says that there is exactly one agent i such that bi 2 [a, x].
Lemma B.4. It must be that jfi 2 N j bi 2 [a, x]gj = 1.
Proof. Suppose there are i 6= j 2 N such that bi, b j 2 [a, x]. By Lemma B.3, bi 2 [a, x] implies
bNni 2 [y, b]. Since j 2 N n i and bT  bS for all S  T, bNni 2 [y, b] implies b j 2 [y, b], a
contradiction. Hence, there can be at most one agent i 2 N such that bi 2 [a, x].
Suppose bi 2 [y, b] for all i 2 N. By Lemma B.3, this means bNni 2 [a, x] for all i 2 N.
Therefore, there must be S  N such that bS 2 [a, x] and for all S0 ( S, bS0 2 [y, b]. By unanimity,
S 6= Æ. If S is singleton, say fig for some i 2 N, then bi 2 [a, x] and we are done. So assume that
there are j 6= k 2 S.
Consider the preference profile PN 2 Sˆn such that r1(Pj) = x+ 1, r2(Pj) = x, r1(Pi) = x0 for all
i /2 S, and r1(Pi) = x for all i 2 S n j. Since bS 2 [a, x] and bS0 2 [y, b] for all S0 ( S, it follows from
the definition of a min-max rule that f (PN) = x+ 1. Let P0k 2 Sˆ be such that r1(P0k) = x0. Since
bSnk 2 [y, b] and f restricted to Sˆn is a min-max rule, it follows that f (P0k, PNnk) = x0. Consider
the preference profile (Qk, PNnk), where Qk = Q. Because f (P0k, PNnk) = x
0, r1(Qk) = x, and
r2(Qk) = x0, by strategy-proofness, f (Qk, PNnk) 2 fx, x0g. Suppose f (Qk, PNnk) = x. Because
f (PN) = x+ 1 and r1(Pk) = x, this means agent kmanipulates at PN via Qk. So, f (Qk, PNnk) = x0.
Let P0j 2 Sˆ be such that r1(P0j ) = x. Since bS 2 [a, x] and x is the top-ranked alternative of the
agents in S at preference profile (P0j , PNnj), we have f (P
0
j , PNnj) = x. As r1(Pk) = r1(Qk) = x, this
means f (P0j ,Qk, PNnfj,kg) = x. Because f (Qk, PNnk) = x
0, r1(Pj) = x+ 1, and r2(Pj) = x, agent j
manipulates at (Qk, PNnfkg) via P0j . This completes the proof of the lemma. 
REMARK B.1. By Lemma B.3 and Lemma B.4, it follows that f restricted to Sˆn is a PDGMVS.
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Our next lemma establishes that f is uncompromising.13 First, we introduce few notations
that we use in the proof of the lemma. For PN 2 S˜n, let N˜(PN) = fi 2 N j Pi /2 Sˆg be the
set of agents who do not have single-peaked preferences at PN. Moreover, for 0  l  n, let
S˜nl = fPN 2 S˜n j jN˜(PN)j  lg be the set of preference profiles where at most l agents have
non-single-peaked preferences. Note that S˜n0 = Sˆn and S˜nn = S˜n.
Lemma B.5. The SCF f is uncompromising.
Proof. Since S˜n0 = Sˆn, f restricted to S˜n0 is uncompromising. Suppose f restricted to S˜nk is uncom-
promising for some k < n. We show that f restricted to S˜nk+1 is uncompromising. It is enough to
show that f restricted to S˜nk+1 is tops-only. To see this, note that if f restricted to S˜nk+1 is tops-only,
then f is uniquely determined on S˜nk+1 by its outcomes on Sˆn. Therefore, since f restricted to Sˆn
is uncompromising, f is uncompromising on S˜nk+1.
Take PN 2 S˜nk+1 and j 2 N˜(PN). Let Pˆj 2 Sˆ be such that r1(Pˆj) = r1(Pj). Then, PN and
(Pˆj, PNnj) are tops-equivalent and (Pˆj, PNnj) 2 S˜nk . It is sufficient to show that f (PN) = f (Pˆj, PNnj).
Assume for contradiction that f (PN) 6= f (Pˆj, PNnj). Assume, without loss of generality, that the
partial dictator of f restricted to Sˆn is agent 1. Then, by the induction hypothesis, agent 1 is the
partial dictator of f restricted to S˜nk , i.e., for all PN 2 S˜nk , if r1(P1) 2 [a, x) then f (PN) 2 [a, x], if
r1(P1) 2 (y, b] then f (PN) 2 [y, b], and if r1(P1) 2 [x, y] then f (PN) = r1(P1). We distinguish two
cases based on the position of the top-ranked alternative of agent 1.
CASE 1. Suppose r1(P1) 2 [a, x) [ (y, b].
We consider the case where r1(P1) 2 [a, x), the proof for the case where r1(P1) 2 (y, b] follows
from symmetric arguments. Since r1(P1) 2 [a, x), we have f (Pˆj, PNnj) 2 [a, x]. Because Pˆj is
single-peaked, if f (Pˆj, PNnj) < f (PN)  r1(Pˆj) or r1(Pˆj)  f (PN) < f (Pˆj, PNnj), then agent j
manipulates at (Pˆj, PNnj) via Pj. Moreover, since f (Pˆj, PNnj) 2 [a, x], if f (PN) < f (Pˆj, PNnj) 
r1(Pˆj) or r1(Pj)  f (Pˆj, PNnj) < f (PN), then by the definition of a top-connected partially single-
peaked domain, agent j manipulates at (Pj, PNnj) via Pˆj. Now, suppose f (Pˆj, PNnj) < r1(Pˆj) <
f (PN). Let P¯j 2 Sˆ be such that r1(P¯j) = f (PN). Since f restricted to S˜nk is uncompromising
and f (Pˆj, PNnj) < r1(Pˆj) < r1(P¯j), we have f (P¯j, PNnj) = f (Pˆj, PNnj). Because r1(P¯j) = f (PN), it
follows that agent j manipulates at (P¯j, PNnj) via Pj. Using a similar argument, it can be shown
13Since every SCF satisfying uncompromisingness is tops-only, Lemma B.5 shows that a top-connected partially
single-peaked domain is a tops-only domain. As in the case of Lemma A.3, it can be easily verified that top-
connected partially single-peaked domains fail to satisfy the sufficient conditions for a domain to be tops-only
identified in Chatterji and Sen (2011) and Chatterji and Zeng (2015).
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that f (PN) < r1(Pˆj) < f (Pˆj, PNnj) leads to a manipulation by agent j. Therefore, f (PN) =
f (Pˆj, PNnj) when r1(P1) 2 [a, x). This completes the proof of the lemma for Case 1.
CASE 2. Suppose r1(P1) 2 [x, y].
Since agent 1 is the partial dictator, f (Pˆj, PNnj) = r1(P1). Consider P¯j 2 Sˆ such that r1(P¯j) =
f (PN). Since (P¯j, PNnj) 2 S˜nk , by the induction hypothesis, we have f (P¯j, PNnj) = r1(P1). Because
r1(P¯j) = f (PN) and f (P¯j, PNnj) = r1(P1) 6= f (PN), agent jmanipulates at (P¯j, PNnj) via Pj. There-
fore, f (PN) = f (Pˆj, PNnj) when r1(P1) 2 [x, y]. This completes the proof of the lemma for Case
2.
Since Cases 1 and 2 are exhaustive, this completes the proof of the lemma by induction. 
Now, we complete the proof of the only-if part of Theorem 4.1. Since f is uncompromising on
S˜n and f restricted to Sˆn is a min-max rule with parameters (bS)SN satisfying the properties as
stated in Lemma B.3 and Lemma B.4, it follows that f is a PDGMVS. 
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